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 Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I am grateful for1
valuable comments from Larry Alexander, Alex Papaefthimiou, Jeffrey Pojanowski,
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Steven Smith, and participants in a colloquium at the
University of Illinois College of Law.
 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws2
(Nugent translation), rev’d ed., 1873 (first published 1748), Bk XI, Ch. VI, 174.
MONTESQUIEU’S MISTAKES 
AND THE TRUE MEANING OF SEPARATION
25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (forthcoming)
Laurence Claus1
“The political liberty of the subject,” said Montesquieu, “is a
tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his
safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be
so constituted as one man needs not be afraid of another.”  The liberty2
of which Montesquieu spoke is directly promoted by apportioning
power among political actors in a way that minimizes opportunities
for those actors to determine conclusively the reach of their own
powers. Montesquieu’s constitution of liberty is the constitution that
most plausibly establishes the rule of law. Montesquieu concluded
that this constitution could best be achieved, and had been achieved
in Britain, by assigning three fundamentally different governmental
activities to different actors. He was wrong. His mistaken conclusion
rested on two errors. The first of these was theoretical; the second,
both empirical and theoretical. 
First, Montesquieu’s analysis was informed by the early
eighteenth-century orthodoxy that no sovereign power could viably
be divided. Montesquieu rightly saw that liberty from the arbitrary
exercise of power would be served by apportioning power among
multiple actors, but he thought the apportionment sustainable only if
along essentialist lines. Lawmaking could be separated from law-
executing, but neither of those kinds of power could durably be
2
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divided internally. The extent to which actors participated in the
exercise of more than one kind of power Montesquieu viewed as a
protective qualification to a primary essentialist separation. He failed
to see that involving multiple actors in every exercise of power, albeit
by permitting actors’ individual involvement in the exercise of more
than one kind of power, is the true protection against arbitrariness.
Checks and balances, not essentialist separation of activities, prevent
actors from conclusively determining the reach of their own powers.
The critical liberty-promoting criterion for separation is not whether
powers differ in kind, but whether apportionment will prevent actors
from conclusively determining the reach of their own powers.
Second, Montesquieu did not appreciate the nature of the
English common law and the mechanism that its doctrine of
precedent established for authoritative judicial exposition of existing
law. That empirical error caused him to distinguish and trivialize the
English judicial function as merely the ad hoc determination of
disputed facts. Consequently, Montesquieu failed to recognize the
lawmaking character of English judicial exposition.
This article analyzes implications of Montesquieu’s mistakes
for  modern claims, both in Britain and in the United States, that
liberty and the rule of law are promoted by separating power in
certain contexts. In particular, this article questions the British
Government’s recent claim that the values underlying separation of
powers theory call for  removing ultimate appellate jurisdiction from
the House of Lords. It also traces Montesquieu’s influence on the
American founders’ attempt to separate power along essentialist lines,
and considers some sub-optimal consequences of that attempt,
including the nondelegation quandary and the emergence of an
unchecked judicial lawmaker.
1. Montesquieu’s theory of checked separation
Along with the title Baron de Montesquieu, Charles Louis de
Secondat inherited from his uncle the office of one of the présidents
à mortier of the Parlement of Bordeaux. The parlement was primarily
an adjudicative body, and the young Montesquieu adjudicated some
3
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 Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu: a Critical Biography, 1961, 17-19.3
 Id., 297-301. See also Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, and4
the separation of powers, French Studies, 1949; M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and
the Separation of Powers, 1967, 72-75. Cf. Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and his
Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole, 1968, 144-150.
disputes. While he had abundant appetite for legal theory and had
immersed himself in Roman law, he found the task of judging
tedious.  The French civil law tradition afforded little opportunity for3
adjudicative creativity, and left Montesquieu with a vision of judging
as primarily fact-finding and rote application of settled and
transparent rules to the facts so found. His office contributed to his
scholarship less through what he did in the job than through whom
he met in it. Friendships formed first with the Duke of Berwick and
later with Viscount Bolingbroke, English aristocrats exiled for their
association with the ousted Stuart monarchy. (Berwick was a son of
James II.) By the time of Montesquieu’s extended visit to England
between 1729 and 1731, Bolingbroke had been rehabilitated
sufficiently to return there, and had become a prolific contributor to
debate about the nature of Britain’s emerging constitution. 
With the departure of James II in 1688, the enactment of the Bill
of Rights of 1689 and the Act of Settlement of 1701, and the union with
Scotland in 1707, the kingdom of Great Britain had entered a new
constitutional age. The seventeenth century’s power-struggle between
the Stuart monarchs and Parliament was over, but what was the true
character of the new dispensation? Did monarch and Parliament
exercise power as separate coordinates, or had they merged into a
single, supreme power? During a long stay that his countryman,
Alexis de Tocqueville, was to emulate in America a century later,
Montesquieu imbibed the debate, and chose a side.  His friend4
Bolingbroke argued for separate-and-coordinate status, though not
consistently, for Bolingbroke’s public reasoning was tactical. He was
jockeying for influence within a political order dominated by his bête
noire, Sir Robert Walpole. Montesquieu observed and wrote as an
outsider, and sought to advance a coherent and timeless theory of
government.
In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu purported to describe, in
4
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 Shackleton, op cit n. 3, 285: “the inclusion in L’Esprit des lois of the essay5
on the English constitution involved a physical incorporation of one manuscript,
on different paper and in different hands, in the other. ... [M]ost of the chapter as
it now stands was written soon after Montesquieu’s return from his travels, and
under the immediate inspiration of English political life.”
  Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk XI, Chs. V and VI, 173-74, 185.6
 Id., 173.7
 Id., 173-74.8
 Cf. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (An Essay concerning the9
True Origin, Extent, and End of Civil Government), (Laslett crit. ed. 2 ), 1967 (firstnd
published 1690), Ch. XII ("Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the
Commonwealth"). Locke’s “federative power” was “much less capable to be
directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws than the executive; and so must
necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it is in ... .”
See also Shackleton, op cit n. 3, 286-87.
abstract fashion, the system of government that he had witnessed.5
His famous tripartite categorization of powers and theory of their
checked separation appears in a chapter entitled “Of the Constitution
of England.” The “direct end” of that constitution was, uniquely,
“political liberty,” by which Montesquieu meant freedom from the
fear that power will be exercised arbitrarily.6
“In every government,” Montesquieu wrote, “there are three
sorts of power.” The legislative power extended to all lawmaking,
including original enactment, amendment, and abrogation.  The7
executive power cleaved in two – execution under international law
and execution under domestic law. The former authorized decisions
about defense and foreign relations. The latter, which he re-named the
power of judging (puissance de juger), authorized decisions punishing
criminals and resolving disputes.  Montesquieu’s characterization of8
executive power addressed only the respects in which execution
involved independent decisionmaking  – executing domestic law in9
the absence of dispute did not rate a mention. Subsequently, however,
he re-described the three kinds of power as “that of enacting laws,
that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of
5
Claus:
Published by Digital USD, 2004
5
 Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk. XI, Ch. VI, 174.10
 Blackstone later noted that the monarch’s power of decree (which he11
called proclamation) was limited to subordinate provision for implementing
enacted law. See I William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1765,
261.
 Montesquieu, op cit n. 2,  Bk. XI, Ch. VI, 176-78.12
 Id., 179.13
 Id., 175-76.14
 See Locke, op cit n. 9, Ch. XII. Locke’s “federative power” was  the15
external relations aspect of the executive power, and the two were “hardly to be
separated and placed at the same time in the hands of distinct persons.” As to
Revolutionary American understanding, see Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the
American Republic, 2  ed., 1998, 159: “`However we may refine and define, therend
is no more than two powers in any government, viz. the power to make laws, and
the power to execute them; for the judicial power is only a branch of the executive,
the CHIEF of every country being the first magistrate.’ [Four Letters on Interesting
Subjects (Phila., 1776), 21.] Even John Adams in 1766 ... regarded `the first grand
division of constitutional powers’ as `those of legislation and those of execution,’
with ̀ the administration of justice’ resting in`the executive part of the constitution.’
[Boston Gazette, Jan 27, 1766, Adams, ed., Works of John Adams, III, 480-482.]”
individuals.”10
In Britain, the three kinds of power were exercised primarily
by different actors. The monarch had no power to issue unilateral
decrees governing future conduct.  Holding the legislative power,11
said Montesquieu, were two Houses of Parliament.  Holding the12
executive power was the monarch.  Holding the power of judging13
were ... juries.14
Montesquieu’s distinctive insight, his advance from John
Locke’s legislative-executive dichotomy,  was that adjudicating15
disputes about relevant facts is a distinct precursor to executing law,
and in England that precursor had been put in distinct hands – the
hands of juries. That was what made the three activities of legislating,
executing and adjudicating fundamentally distinguishable and
separable, and why Montesquieu could conclude that their primary
exercise in England had been separated. The officers of the monarch
6
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 Montesquieu, op cit n. 2,  Bk. II Ch. I, 9.16
executed law, but in the event of dispute about facts, juries were
assembled to exercise the power of judging. Judging did not involve
elaborating law; it involved deciding who was telling the truth.
Judging was distinct from legislating precisely because it did not
involve making rules for future cases. Today’s jury verdict had no
significance for tomorrow’s. Applying the law to the facts found by
juries was no different from applying the law in circumstances where
there was no dispute. In the former case, the actors who applied the
law – who executed it – were called judges. In the latter case, where
facts were undisputed, courts were uninvolved, and the law was
applied – was executed – by other actors. In either case, the actors
concerned were officers of the executive government. In either case,
their action in executing the law was normally a matter of rote
application, having no effect on the content of the law. That
understanding appears to have been consistent with Montesquieu’s
own adjudicative experience in France.  
Montesquieu did not acknowledge that English courts might
have to resolve disputes about what the law meant. He noted that
under monarchies, laws might not be explicit, and then judges might
have to “investigate their spirit.” But the “nearer a government
approaches towards a republic, the more the manner of judging
becomes settled and fixed.” The British system of government was
well en route from monarchy, “in which a single person governs by
fixed and established laws” to republic, “in which the body, or only
a part of the people, is possessed of the supreme power.”16
In republics, the very nature of the
constitution requires the judges to follow
the letter of the law; otherwise the law
might be explained to the prejudice of
every citizen, in cases where their honour,
property, or life are concerned.
At Rome the judges had no more
to do than to declare, that the persons
accused were guilty of a particular crime,
and then the punishment was found in
7
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 Id., Bk. VI, Ch. III, 85-86.17
 Id., Bk. XI, Ch. VI, 182.18
 Id., 176. Revolutionary Americans agreed. “As Jefferson said to Pendleton19
in 1776, in relation to the legislator the judge must `be a mere machine.’ The
people’s making of law would dispense mercy and justice ̀ equally and impartially
to every description of men,’ while, as any radical Whig knew, the dispensations
of ̀ the judge, or of the executive power, will be the eccentric impulses of whimsical,
capricious designing man.’ [Jefferson to Pendleton, Aug. 26, 1776, Boyd, ed.,
Jefferson Papers, I, 505.]” (Wood, op cit n. 15,  161.) “If the spirit of the law had to
be considered, said the author of The People the Best Governors, then it should be
done only on appeal to the representatives of the people. If the judges `put such a
construction on matters as they think most agreeable to the spirit and reason of the
law ..., they assume what is in fact the prerogative of the legislature, for those that
made the laws ought to give them a meaning when they are doubtful.’” (Id., 301-
302.)
the laws, as may be seen in divers laws
still extant. In England the jury give their
verdict whether the fact brought under
their cognizance be proved or not; if it be
proved, the judge pronounces the
punishment inflicted by the law, and for
this he need only to open his eyes.17
Britain’s lawmaker was a representative body, and thus “the national
judges are no more than a mouth that pronounces the words of the
law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or
rigour.”  This was as it should be. “[T]hough the tribunals ought not18
to be fixed, the judgements ought; and to such a degree as to be ever
conformable to the letter of the law. Were they to be the private
opinion of the judge, people would then live in society, without
exactly knowing the nature of their obligations.”  The intellectual19
energy involved in performing the judicial function lay in deciding
the facts. Where that task was separated from the executive – when it
was given to juries – use of the term “judge” to describe the executive
officer who applied the law after disputed facts had been resolved
was more a matter of courtesy (almost of irony) than of description.
Ongoing ambivalence about whether the professional judges
8
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 See Steven G. Calabresi and Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office:20
Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1045, 1128-
1131 (1994).
 See id., 1131-1132.21
 Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk. XI, Ch. IV, 172-173.22
who actually executed the law – applied it to the facts found by juries
– were anything other than executive officers can be seen in the
American founders’ self-conscious choice to permit concurrent
holding of judicial and other executive offices under the
Constitution.  Thus the nation’s first three confirmed Chief Justices20
each, for a time, concurrently served persona designata in other
executive capacities. John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth were ambassadors
to Britain and France respectively in an era when that office truly was
extraordinary and plenipotentiary, extending to single-handed
negotiation of treaties. And John Marshall, notoriously, doubled as
Secretary of State through the twilight (right up to the midnight) of
the Adams administration, as Jay had done in the first Washington
administration during Jefferson’s absence in France.21
For Montesquieu, the genius of the British system of
government lay in combining separation with supervision. 
[Political liberty] is there only when there
is no abuse of power; but constant
experience shews us, that every man
invested with power is apt to abuse it,
and to carry his authority as far as it will
go. Is it not strange, though true, to say,
that virtue itself has need of limits? 
To prevent this abuse, it is
necessary from the very nature of things,
power should be a check to power. A
government may be so constituted, as no
man shall be compelled to do things to
which the law does not oblige him, nor
forced to abstain from things which the
law permits.  22
9
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 Id., Ch. VI, 183. “The executive power ... ought to have a share in the23




 Id., 182. Blackstone similarly observed that Parliament could check the26
monarch’s exercise of executive prerogatives through its power to impeach those
on whose advice executive powers were improvidently exercised: I Blackstone, op
cit n. 11, 150-151, 244.
 Montesquieu, op cit n. 2,  Bk. XIX, Ch. XXVII, 356.27
Parliament’s legislative power was checked by the monarch’s power
to reject legislation, which protected the separation of legislative and
executive power.  The monarch’s executive power was checked by23
Parliament, primarily through Parliament’s exclusive power to tax
and to appropriate the proceeds to finance the executive’s activities.24
Moreover the lawmaker “has a right and ought to have the means of
examining in what manner its laws have been executed.” Though the
monarch could not be impeached and tried for misconduct, his
officers could be  – the lower House of Parliament could impeach25
them and the upper House could try, convict, and punish them.  26
In a later discussion of the British party system, Montesquieu
observed that the monarch “is frequently obliged to give his
confidence to those who have most offended him, and to disgrace the
men who have best served him: he does that by necessity which other
princes do by choice.”  Why would the monarch be obliged to take27
counsel from persons whom he did not even like? Montesquieu did
not elaborate, but doubtless he was obliquely referring to the nascent
convention of cabinet government, by which the monarch exercised
his executive powers with the advice and consent of ministers he
appointed on the basis that they had the confidence of the House of
Commons (that is, on the basis that they could command a working
majority of supporters in the Commons, and thus could persuade that
body to finance the executive’s activities). That allusion did not
adequately express the dawning truth of unvaried and complete
monarchical compliance with the wishes of such ministers, but de facto
10
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 Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, 173-74, 185.28
 Wood, op cit n. 15, 453 (quoting Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, ed. Peden,29
120).
subordination of the monarchy could not have been as obvious in the
first half of the eighteenth century as it has become through a further
two and a half centuries of consistent practice. During Montesquieu’s
visit to England, the institutions of monarchy and parliament must
still have seemed to  regard each other warily, having clashed so often
and so violently over the preceding century.
Separation of power, then, was less significant in what it
bestowed on the designated actors than in what it denied to other
actors. Seating the primary exercise of a power in one actor did not
give that actor carte blanche in the exercise of the power, it just denied
the primary exercise of that power to others.
According to Montesquieu, the purpose of Britain’s
apportionment of power among multiple actors was to maximize
liberty.  The more obstacles that lie in the path of any actor’s exercise28
of power, the less likely power is to be exercised, and a fortiori the less
likely power is to be exercised badly. The more minds that must
concur in the constitutionality and virtue of a proposed exercise of
power, the more likely that exercise is to be constitutional and
virtuous. Apportioning power may promote good faith in its exercise,
by resolving conflicts of interest. Apportioning power may prevent
any actor from conclusively determining the reach of her own powers.
Thomas Jefferson would later observe that “the powers of
government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies
of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits,
without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.”  But29
these desirable ends do not call for apportionment on strictly
essentialist lines, and that was not the true nature of apportionment
in Britain. Yet Montesquieu chose to pretend that it was, that Britain’s
constitution separated three essentially different governmental
activities and then subjected their performance to supervisory checks
designed to protect the primary separation. He could more accurately
have characterized the British apportionment of power as providing
11
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 The libertarian claim that separating those who exercise executive and30
judicial kinds of power from legislative bodies will necessarily produce fewest
operative laws – if any of three separate sets of minds think a possible law would
violate constitutional norms, then no such law will be enacted and successfully
executed  –  fails in relation to any constitutional scheme under which the judicial
power extends to expounding constitutional duties to act and enjoining compliance.
See, e.g., the German Abortion Cases, 39 BverfGE 1 (1975) and 88 BverfGE 203
(1993) (Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany) (translated
excerpts in Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 2  ed., 1997, 335-356); the Hungarian Benefits Case, 4 E. Eur.nd
Case Rep. Const. L. 64 (1997) (Constitutional Court of Hungary).
 Shackleton, op cit n. 3,  306-7.31
 Politica methodice digesta, 1603.32
 De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1625, Book I, Ch. 3 § 7; Apologeticus eorum qui33
Holandiae praefuerunt, 1640, Ch. 1.
 De Statu Regionum Germaniae, 1661.34
for multiple actors to participate in every governmental action.
Why was Montesquieu so concerned to distinguish the
essences of three governmental activities and to claim that the
separation of those activities was the secret of maximized liberty?
Why did he not simply say that dividing government power among
multiple actors might promote liberty, especially if every exercise of
power ultimately depended on the approval of multiple actors?  In30
other words, why did he characterize the British model as a checked
separation of different kinds of power, rather than simply as power-
sharing?  Why try to distinguish primary exercises of power from
participatory ones? The answer seems to lie in then-prevailing
understandings of the nature of political sovereignty. In the pantheon
of French political theorists, Montesquieu’s most prominent
predecessor was Jean Bodin. Montesquieu possessed two copies  of31
Les Six Livres de la République, first published in 1576, in which Bodin
characterized sovereignty as indivisible. The indivisibility of
sovereignty was an unquestioned assumption underlying the
scholarship of Johannes Althusius,  Hugo Grotius,  Ludolph Hugo32 33 34
and Samuel von Pufendorf. It was the foundation of Pufendorf’s
critique of the Hapsburg Holy Roman Empire, which he condemned
12
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 Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of35
Europe, 8  ed, 1719, 282: “Its irregular Constitution of Government is one of theth
chief Causes of its Infirmity; it being neither one entire Kingdom, neither properly
a Confederacy, but participating of both kinds: For the Emperour has not the entire
Soveraignty over the whole Empire, nor each Prince in particular over his
Territories; and tho' the former is more than a bare Administrator, yet the latter
have a greater share in the Soveraignty than can be attributed to any Subjects or
Citizens whatever, tho' never so great.” Pufendorf drew an analogy to a building
designed in disregard of the “Rules of Architecture” or which had suffered from
“some great Fault” that had “been cur'd and made up after a strange and unseemly
manner.” Of the Law of Nature and Nations, 4  ed, 1729, 679.th
as an “irregular,” unsustainable system of government because
sovereignty was divided between the emperor and the German
princes.35
Montesquieu did not question the prevailing orthodoxy that
ultimate sovereign power could not be divided without risking chaos.
But for Montesquieu, that principle was satisfied by a system that
established separate mechanisms for engaging in essentially different
governmental activities, so long as for each of those activities, only
one ultimate mechanism was available. So long as there was only one
ultimate way to make law, there was no risk of legal incoherence. So
long as there was only one chief executive, law would be executed
consistently. To characterize the British system as sustainably
providing for power to be exercised by multiple actors coordinately
rather than in hierarchy, Montesquieu thought that he had to
characterize the activities of those actors as essentially different. The
British division of powers was sustainable because it did not provide
more than one ultimate way for any particular kind of power to be
exercised. Only Parliament possessed the sovereign power of
lawmaking, albeit that Parliament was checked in exercise of that
power by the monarch. Only the monarch possessed the sovereign
power of executing law, albeit that he was checked in the exercise of
that power by Parliament.
Was the separated sovereign power of judging comparably
checked? Yes. “It is possible,” wrote Montesquieu, “that the law,
which is clear sighted in one sense, and blind in another, might, in
some cases, be too severe.” Where on the facts found by juries the law
13
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 Montesquieu, op cit n. 2,  Bk. XI, Ch. VI, 182.36
 See, e.g., the Titus Oates Case, 10 Howell’s State Trials, 1325, 1328; 1037
House of Commons Journal 176-77 (June 11, 1689).
 Robert Stevens, Law and Politics: The House of Lords as a Judicial Body,38
1800-1976, 1978, 29-30: “In 1834 the Lords for the last time decided an appeal
without any law lord present; [n. 126: ... The common law judges attended and gave
their opinions, and then the lay peers present spoke and voted. ...] in 1844 the
convention that lay lords never vote was established. ... By the late thirties there
were seven law lords – that is, former Lord Chancellors or ennobled judges; a
`professional’ court was at last possible. The definition of a law lord was still vague,
but the duty of the lay lord was increasingly clear: he was to be a nonvoting
member of the quorum in appellate hearings.”
 See Paul Carmichael and Brice Dickson, eds., The House of Lords: Its39
Parliamentary and Judicial Roles, 1999, 107 et seq.
 Stevens, op cit n. 38, 12: “At the end of the seventeenth century the40
publication of Showers’ Reports was held a breach of privilege, and as late as 1762
a similar threat was made when a text writer wished to cite decisions of the House.
The first regular reports were those published by Josiah Brown late in the
eighteenth century, but they were far from perfect since they largely ignored the
reasoning in the speeches.”
 Id.,  30.41
imposed an unduly severe sentence, the House of Lords could
exercise an appellate jurisdiction “to moderate the law in favour of the
law itself, by mitigating the sentence.”  Apart from ignoring the36
Lords’ jurisdiction to entertain appeals in civil disputes, Montesquieu
failed to recognize that the Lords’ decisions might change the common
law. Invoking the monarchical prerogative of clemency was only one
of their options.  The Lords’ appellate jurisdiction was, however, then37
exercised directly by the House as a whole,  not by a committee38
composed of judicial specialists, the so-called Lords of Appeal in
Ordinary, or Law Lords.  The speeches through which the lords39
delivered their decisions were rarely reported.  Until the40
professionalizing of the appellate jurisdiction in the nineteenth
century, “the House of Lords had made relatively little contribution
to the common law of England and only a limited one to equity.
Henceforth, with the adequate supply of law lords, there was a much
greater opportunity to shape English law... .”  Nonetheless, the41
14
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 III William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1765, 56.42
 Stevens, op cit n. 38, 13.43
 Department of Constitutional Affairs Consultation Paper, Constitutional44
Reform: A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, 2003, ¶1.
 Id., ¶34.45
 Id., ¶36.46
 “1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any47
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...“
House was, as it remains, “the supreme court of judicature in the
kingdom.”   And to the eighteenth-century House of Lords,42
“[a]ppeals were in every sense a part of the political work of the
House, regarded as part of the Blackstonian balance within the
political sovereign.”  43
2. Britain’s current reforms
On June 12, 2003, the British Government announced that it
intends to establish a “new Supreme Court for the United
Kingdom,”  to which the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords44
will be transferred, along with the Law Lords themselves. “The
primary objective of the new arrangements is to establish the Court as
a body separate from Parliament.”  Appointees to the Court, if also45
members of the House of Lords, will be barred from sitting in the
legislative chamber during their tenure on the Court.  Citing Article46
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights,  now incorporated47
into British domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998, the
British Government has given the following reason for its plan.
[T]he fact that the Law Lords are a
Committee of the House of Lords can
raise issues about the appearance of
independence from the legislature.
Looking at it from the other way round,
15
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 Id., 1.2. See also Lord Bingham of Cornhill, A New Supreme Court for the48
United Kingdom, The Constitution Unit, Spring Lecture 2002, May 1, 2002, passim.
 Lord Falconer of Thoroton, Foreword to Department of Constitutional49
Affairs Consultation Paper, Constitutional Reform: reforming the office of the Lord
Chancellor, 2003.
 1 Lord Campbell, Lives of the Lords Chancellors, 4  ed. (revised), 1874,50 th
1-31.
 See id. 61-99.51
 See 2 Campbell, op cit n. 50, 1-85.52
the requirement for the appearance of
impartiality and independence also
increasingly limits the ability of the Law
Lords to contribute to the work of the
House of Lords, thus reducing the value
to both them and the House of their
membership.48
By parity of reasoning, the office of Lord High Chancellor is to
be abolished. No longer will a position exist that empowers its holder
concurrently to preside in the House of Lords, to sit in the Cabinet,
and to adjudicate appeals. Abolition will, according to the office’s
final occupant, “put the relationship between the executive, the
judiciary and the legislature on a modern footing, and clarify the
independence of the judiciary.”  The chancellorship, almost as old as49
the monarchy,  held during its long history by such luminously50
independent spirits as Thomas à Becket  and Thomas More,  source51 52
of Equity and precursor in power to the modern ministry, will cease.
The integrity of judging, according to the British Government,
is promoted by keeping that activity wholly out of the hands of
lawmakers. But is it really? And will the British Government’s
reforms really achieve a complete separation of judging from
lawmaking? The evolution of British constitutional practice during the
eighteenth century established that there was no meaningful
separation of executive and legislative power in Britain. Effectively,
“the executive power [is] committed to a certain number of persons
16
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 11 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art11
16
 Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk. XI Ch. VI, 179.53
 Id., 176-79.54
 U.S. Const. Art. I § 1.55
  Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk. XI Ch. VI, 179.56
  U.S. Const. Art. II § 1.57
 The British monarch’s last exercise of the veto had been Queen Anne’s58
rejection of the Scottish Militia Bill in 1708, but Blackstone gave his readers no
reason to doubt the ongoing substance of the monarchical veto power: I William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1765, 149-150, 253.
   U.S. Const. Art. II § 7 cl. 3. 59
selected from the legislative body,” a circumstance in which
Montesquieu erroneously predicted “there would be an end then of
liberty.”  Is the cause of liberty any more substantially served by53
separating the power of judging from that of lawmaking? And has
that separation ever truly been achieved?
3. The American Separation
In the document that emerged from Philadelphia in 1787, the
American founders adopted a structure of government that, in its
provision for checked separation, replicated Montesquieu’s account
of the British system in all ways but one. “All legislative powers
herein granted” were vested in a bicameral representative body, as
Montesquieu had favored,  with states substituted for aristocracy as54
the interest represented in the upper chamber.  “The executive55
Power” was vested in an individual, as Montesquieu had
recommended,  with a president substituted for a monarch.  56 57
The legislative power of Congress was checked by a
presidential veto that mirrored the British monarch’s  but which58
could be overridden by a sufficiently-united legislature.  The59
executive power of the President was checked by Congress’s control
17
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   U.S. Const. Art. I §8 cll. 1 and 2, § 9 cl. 7.60
   U.S. Const. Art. II § 4.61
 I Blackstone, op cit n. 11, 261-262.62
 U.S. Const. Art. II § 2 cl. 2.63
  Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk. XI Ch. VI, 173. Blackstone made clear that64
war- and treaty-making were still de jure prerogatives of the monarch in Britain: I
Blackstone, op cit n. 11, 242-253.
 U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 cl. 11. See Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War65
Powers, 69 U.Chi. L. Rev. 1543 (2002).
 U.S. Const. Art. II § 2 cl. 2.66
 U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 cl. 10.67
 Federalist No. 47: “The Particular Structure of the New Government and68
the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts,” New York Packet, Feb. 1,
1788.
of the public purse  and Congress’s power to impeach and convict60
him and his officers of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”  Where the61
British monarch’s appointment of ministers and judges  required de62
facto approval of the House of Commons (mediated through the
ministers in the latter case), the President’s appointments required
approval of the Senate.  Moreover, his executive decisionmaking “in63
respect of things dependent on the law of nations”  was checked by64
the powers of declaring war,  of ratifying treaties,  and “[t]o define65 66
and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations”  that the67
Constitution invested in legislators.
In explaining the convention’s scheme of checked separation,
James Madison said: “The oracle who is always consulted and cited
on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author
of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at
least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the
attention of mankind.”  Noting that “[t]he British Constitution was68
to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic
poetry,” Madison explained that Montesquieu“did not mean that
18




 U.S. Const. Art. III § 1.70
 U.S. Const. Art. II §§ 2 cl.2 and 4.71
 Federalist No. 81: “The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the72
Judicial Authority.”
these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over
the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still
more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye [namely,
Britain], can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power
of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a
free constitution, are subverted.”69
When the American founders reached “[t]he judicial Power,”
however, they chose to vest it absolutely in a separate hierarchy of
courts.  The only influence that the other branches had upon its70
exercise came through the blunt instruments of appointing the life-
tenured judges and removing them for misconduct.  There was no71
counterpart to the House of Lords’ supervision of the British judiciary.
Alexander Hamilton argued that “the important constitutional check
which the power of instituting impeachments in one part of the
legislative body, and of determining upon them in the other, would
give to that body upon the members of the judicial department” was
“a complete security.”  When, however, Congress moved to exercise72
that check against Samuel Chase, an anxious Chief Justice John
Marshall wrote to his beleaguered colleague in the following terms:
According to the antient doctrine a jury
finding a verdict against the law of the
case was liable to an attaint; & the amount
of the present doctrine seems to be that a
Judge giving a legal opinion contrary to
the opinion of the legislature is liable to
impeachment. As, for convenience &
humanity the old doctrine of attaint has
yielded to the silent, moderate but not
19
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 Marshall to Chase, Jan. 23, 1804, reproduced in III Albert J. Beveridge, The73
Life of John Marshall, 1919, between 176 and 177. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
 N.Y. Const. Art. XXXII (1777): “... [A] court shall be instituted for the trial74
of impeachments, and the correction of errors, under the regulations which shall be
established by the legislature; and to consist of the president of the senate, for the
time being, and the senators, chancellor, and judges of the supreme court, or the
major part of them; except that when an impeachment shall be prosecuted against
the chancellor, or either of the judges of the supreme court, the person so
impeached shall be suspended from exercising his office until his acquittal; and, in
like manner, when an appeal from a decree in equity shall be heard, the chancellor
shall inform the court of the reasons of his decree, but shall not have a voice in the
final sentence. And if the cause to be determined shall be brought up by writ of
error, on a question of law, on a judgment in the supreme court, the judges of that
court shall assign the reasons of such their judgment, but shall not have a voice for
its affirmance or reversal.” Cf. Art. III: “...[T]he governor for the time being, the
chancellor, and the judges of the supreme court, or any two of them, together with
the governor, shall be, and hereby are, constituted a council to revise all bills about
to be passed into laws by the legislature; and for that purpose shall assemble
themselves from time to time, when the legislature shall be convened; for which,
nevertheless they shall not receive any salary or consideration, under any presence
whatever. And that all bills which have passed the senate and assembly shall,
before they become laws, be presented to the said council for their revisal and
consideration; and if, upon such revision and consideration, it should appear
improper to the said council, or a majority of them, that the said bill should become
a law of this State, that they return the same, together with their objections thereto
less operative influence of new trials, I
think the modern doctrine of
impeachment should yield to an appellate
jurisdiction in the legislature. A reversal
of those legal opinions deemed unsound
by the legislature would certainly better
comport with the mildness of our
character than a removal of the Judge
who has rendered them unknowing of his
fault.73
Participation by legislators in the ultimate exercise of judicial
power had American precedents.  New York’s first state constitution
established a final appellate body that included members of the state
legislature’s upper chamber.  Connecticut’s final appellate body74
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in writing, to the senate or house of assembly (in which soever the same shall have
originated) who shall enter the objection sent down by the council at large in their
minutes, and proceed to reconsider the said bill. But if, after such reconsideration,
two-thirds of the said senate or house of assembly shall, notwithstanding the said
objections, agree to pass the same, it shall together with the objections, be sent to the
other branch of the legislature, where it shall also be reconsidered, and, if approved
by two-thirds of the members present, shall be a law.” See also Stevens, op cit n. 38,
13, n. 39: “In New Jersey, the Governor in Council became the Court of Appeal of
last resort. This latter arrangement was presumably influenced by the appellate
jurisdiction of the Privy Council.” This was despite earlier colonial protest against
the concurrent occupation of legislative and judicial offices. In 1744, four years
before The Spirit of the Laws appeared, the New Jersey House of Assembly resolved
“That it is the opinion of this Committee [committee of the whole House], that it is
inconsistent with that Freedom and priviledge [sic] the people of this colony (by
their happy Constitution have a right to enjoy) that the same person should be
Chief Justice at the same Time one of his Majesty’s Council in this Colony.”
Archives of the State of New Jersey, 1891, First Series, XV, 371 f., quoted in Paul
Merrill Spurlin, Montesquieu in America, 1969, 30.
 Stevens, op cit n. 38, 13, citing Dwight Loomis and J. Gilbert Calhoun, The75
Judicial and Civil History of Connecticut, Ch. 10.
combined the governor with the upper house.  Addressing “the75
People of the State of New York,” Alexander Hamilton sought to
explain the anomaly of investing unchecked judicial power in a court
“composed of a distinct body of magistrates, instead of being one of
the branches of the legislature, as in the government of Great Britain
and in that of the State.”
To insist upon this point the authors of
the objection must renounce the meaning
they have labored to annex to the
celebrated maxim, requiring a separation
of the departments of power. It shall,
nevertheless, be conceded to them,
agreeably in the interpretation given to
that maxim in the course of these papers,
that it is not violated by vesting the
ultimate power of judging in a part of the
legislative body. But though this be not an
absolute violation of that excellent rule;
yet it verges so nearly upon it, as on this
21
Claus:
Published by Digital USD, 2004
21
 Federalist No. 81.76
 Federalist No. 78. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 223, Justice77
Scalia accurately interpreted Hamilton’s reasoning to be that the judiciary was
politically insignificant “because the binding effect of its acts was limited to
particular cases and controversies.” The doctrine of precedent makes that
proposition untrue.
 Id., n. 1. Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk. XI Ch. VI, 178: “Of the three powers78
above-mentioned, the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing: there remain,
therefore, only two ... .”
account alone to be less eligible than the
mode preferred by the convention.76
How was a legislative check on the judiciary any more
proximate a violation of the “celebrated” separation principle than
was a legislative check on the executive or an executive check on the
legislature? Was the judiciary somehow less in need of supervision?
In an earlier paper, Hamilton had argued just that. The judiciary, he
contended, “is beyond comparison the weakest of the three
departments of power” and “can never attack with success either of
the other two.” He allowed that “individual oppression may now and
then proceed from the courts of justice,” but concluded that “the
general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that
quarter, I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from
both the legislature and the Executive.”  For these propositions, he77
cited Montesquieu: “The celebrated Montesquieu, speaking of them,
says: `Of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is next to
nothing.’”78
But Montesquieu meant the fact-finding function of juries. That
was indeed politically insignificant.  Exercise of that judicial power by
that judiciary matters only to the parties in dispute. The threat to
liberty posed by power-holders conclusively determining the
substantive criteria for exercising their own powers is, in the case of
jury findings, only a threat to the liberty of the parties in dispute.
Montesquieu thought that even that adjudicative power deserved to
be checked. Hamilton’s argument that adjudication was less in need
of check turned on adjudication having no significance for non-
22
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 Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk. XI Ch. VI, 173.79
 See IV Blackstone, op cit n. 11, 342-343, 407; III Blackstone, 349 et seq.80
 I Blackstone, op cit n.11, 258 (indexed 267):”our kings have delegated81
their whole judicial power to the judges of their several courts; which are the grand
despositary of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and have gained a known and
stated jurisdiction, regulated by certain and established rules, which the Crown
itself cannot now alter but by act of parliament. [page footnote: 2 Hawk. P.C. 2]
And, in order to maintain both the dignity and independence of the judges in the
superior courts, it is enacted by the statute 13 W. III c. 2. That their commissions
shall be made (not, as formerly, durante bene placito, but) quamdiu bene se gesserint,
and their salaries ascertained and established; but that it may be lawful to remove
them on the address of both houses of parliament. And now, by the noble
improvements of that law in the statute of 1 Geo. III c. 23 ... the judges are continued
parties.
4. Montesquieu and Judicial Lawmaking
“There is no liberty,” wrote Montesquieu, “if the judiciary
power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the
legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with violence and oppression.”  The reason to separate79
judicial power was to protect the parties in dispute. If the adjudicator
could make law, then those parties would be subject to “arbitrary
control,” for the adjudicator might change the rules of the fight mid-
way. If the adjudicator were an executive officer, then parties in
dispute with the executive government might have no recourse. These
concerns had indeed fostered the jury system, going back to the
barons’ claim in chapter 39 of Magna Carta to be subject to forfeitures
only by the judgment of peers or the law of the land.  But the concern80
for separation from the executive also underlay early eighteenth-
century reforms that freed professional judges from the monarch’s
control. The Act of Settlement of 1701 had transformed the basis of
judicial tenure from monarchical pleasure to good behavior. For the
first time, the King’s judges were insulated from his whims, and could
be removed only through parliamentary impeachment.  Bolingbroke,81
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in their offices during good behaviour, notwithstanding any demise of the crown
(which was formerly held immediately to vacate their seats) and their full salaries
are absolutely secured to them during the continuance of their commissions: his
majesty having been pleased to declare, that ̀ he looked upon the independence and
uprightness of the judges, as essential to the impartial administration of justice; as
one of the best securities of the rights and liberties of his subjects; and as most
conducive to the honour of the crown.’”
 Kramnick, op cit n. 4, 8.82
 Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk. VI Ch. I, 81: “[I]n monarchies there must be83
courts of judicature; these must give their decisions; the decisions must be
preserved and learned, that we may judge in the same manner to-day as yesterday,
and that the lives and property of the citizens may be as certain and fixed as the
very constitution of the state.”
at the promising start of a disappointing political career, had helped
prepare and introduce the measure.  Of this, Montesquieu made82
nothing. He did not see that the officers of the British government
who applied law to jury findings of fact were doing something
significant.
Montesquieu did not understand the nature of the common
law. He showed no awareness of the opinion-writing practices of the
English judges on which the common law was built and which could
readily be turned to exposition of statutes and other authoritative
texts. He seems not to have appreciated how the English common law
had been formed through deference to precedent. He did not notice
the binding nature of precedent within a judicial hierarchy. He did
not realize that the exercise of judicial power in one case had
implications for other cases; that dispute resolution affected more
than the parties before the court; that the doctrine of precedent could
turn individual dispute resolution into law of general application.
Most critically, he did not see that the doctrine of precedent applied
to judicial interpretation of authoritative texts. 
Montesquieu’s own limited judicial experience in France had
sparked the insight that adjudicative consistency called for those
applying law under a monarchy to have regard to past applications
of that law.  But he seems not to have realized that this was the83
practice of the English courts, and the way in which most English law
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 Id., 82: “In proportion as the decisions of the courts of judicature are84
multiplied in monarchies, the law is loaded with decrees that sometimes contradict
one another; either because succeeding judges are of a different way of thinking, or
because the same causes are sometimes well, and at other times ill defended; or, in
fine, by reason of an infinite number of abuses, to which all human regulations are
liable. This is a necessary evil, which the legislator redresses from time to time, as
contrary even to the spirit of moderate governments. For when people are obliged
to have recourse to the courts of judicature, this should come from the nature of the
constitution, and not from the contradiction or uncertainty of the law.”
Montesquieu did not notice that the doctrine of precedent had been adopted by the
English courts to remedy such contradictions and uncertainties.
 Id., Bk. VI, Ch. III, 85-86; Bk. XI, Ch. VI, 176, 182 (all quoted in Section 1,85
supra.)
had been created. In a monarchical system like that of France,
Montesquieu saw substantial risk that the law might be uncertain, and
that the decisions of the courts might contribute to that uncertainty.84
But he thought that risk de minimis in a quasi-republic, like Britain, in
which the people’s representatives assembled regularly  to legislate.85
When Montesquieu spoke of judicial power, or rather, of the
“power of judging,” he meant a function wholly shorn of lawmaking
potential. It was fact-finding, a precursor to the execution of existing
law. When Montesquieu spoke of the legislative power, he meant the
power to make law, by whomever held. But resolving disputes may
require judicial exposition of existing law. Exposition is elaboration.
Elaboration is lawmaking. Why? Because the doctrine of precedent
makes it so. If a court uses more words to explain why a statute
applies to established facts than the legislator used in the statute, and
if courts pay attention to those additional words, then the expounding
court has succeeded in supplementing the law. Identical elaborating
words could have been included by the original legislator in his
authoritative text. If observed and applied by courts, those words are
equally law whether they were written by the original legislator or by
an embroidering judicial body. Written expositions of legal texts are
just an alternative vehicle for expanding the corpus of the law,
analogous to the Roman rescripts that Montesquieu condemned as “a
25
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 “The Roman emperors manifested their will like our princes, by decrees86
and edicts; but they permitted, which our princes do not, both the judges and
private people to interrogate them by letters in their several differences [i.e.
disputes]; and their answers were called rescripts. The decretals of the popes are
rescripts, strictly speaking. It is plain, that this is a bad method of legislation. Those
who thus apply for laws are improper guides to the legislator; the facts are always
wrongly stated. Julius Capiltolinus says, that Trajan often refused to give this kind
of rescripts [sic], lest a single decision, and frequently a particular favour, should
be extended to all cases. Macrinus resolved to abolish all those rescripts; he could
not bear that the answers of Commodus, Caracalla, and all those other ignorant
princes, should be considered as laws. Justinian thought otherwise, and he filled his
compilement with them.” Id., Bk. XXIX, Ch. XVII, 290-91.
 Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,87
115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085 (2002).
bad method of legislation,” but legislation nonetheless.  There is86
nothing that courts can say about the meaning of an authoritative text
ex post enactment that the text’s enacter could not have written in that
text ex ante.87
Montesquieu saw none of this. His impoverished account of
the judicial power in England treated law as exogenous to the exercise
of that power, a pellucid source that unambiguously dictated the
consequences of jury fact-findings in every case. The House of Lords
might exercise its ameliorative jurisdiction to alter those consequences
in individual cases, but the corpus of the law remained untouched.
For Montesquieu, judicial decisionmaking in England left only an
inconsequential and patternless array of one-off outcomes, a morass
of single instances. That perception alone can explain his trivialization
of the judicial function and his disregard of the role of appointed
judges as authoritative exponents of both common and statutory law.
His focus was solely on the fact-finding function of juries, assembled
ad hoc and having no influence beyond the case in which they served.
He did not critically analyze the function of applying law, nor
distinguish its exercise by professional judges from its exercise by
other executive officers. The only reason Montesquieu could see why
English judges were sometimes called on to apply law was the
existence of anterior factual disputes that separate actors (juries) had
resolved. That there might be doubt or even dispute about the
meaning of British law, Montesquieu did not consider at all.
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 U.S. Const. Art. III §2 cl. 2.88
 Federalist No. 81: The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the89
Judicial Authority.
 Id.90
If Montesquieu had understood that the English courts decided
questions of law, and that their answers to those questions constituted
law, how would he have categorized that function within his tripartite
schema? The question surely answers itself. When judges make law,
they exercise legislative power. This has four critical implications for
applying his theory of checked separation to the judiciary.
(a.) Judicial lawmaking is not “judging”
An ultimate appellate body that decides only questions of law
does not exercise Montesquieu’s power of judging at all.  It exercises
legislative power to decide the question of law, and it exercises
executive power when it applies the law to the parties in dispute. If,
on the other hand, the ultimate appellate body were to have
jurisdiction to decide questions of fact, that is, jurisdiction to
substitute its judgment of facts in dispute, then it would possess
Montesquieu’s power of judging – indeed, it would possess the whole
of that power, for an appellate jurisdiction with respect to any
question affords the whole adjudicative power with respect to that
question. Checks and balances between Congress and President may
be distinguished in this regard, for they require cooperative
participation in order for a power to be exercised at all. An appellate
check on the power to decide a question is an appropriation of the
power to decide, not merely a participation in its exercise. At the
American founding, Alexander Hamilton encountered this objection
to the proposed constitution’s vesting of “appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact,” in the Supreme Court.  That vesting had “been88
scarcely called in question in regard to matters of law; but the clamors
have been loud against it as applied to matters of fact ... as an implied
supersedure of the trial by jury... .”  Hamilton responded, somewhat89
lamely, that the words “do not necessarily imply a re-examination in
the Supreme Court of facts decided by juries in the inferior courts.”90
Through the seventh amendment, the founding generation swiftly
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 U.S. Const. Amdt. VII: “In Suits at common law, where the value in91
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” Cf. New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
confirmed the limited character of appellate review.91
If an ultimate appellate body decides only questions of law,
vacating and remanding dubious fact-findings for re-adjudication by
separate fact-finders (for example, by juries), then Montesquieu’s
principle of checked separation is not violated.  
(b.) Twin-track lawmakers endanger liberty no more than
one-track lawmakers
Montesquieu’s reason for favoring separation of legislative and
judicial power goes unsatisfied regardless of whether the officer who
applies law to disputing parties also participates in a legislative body.
Montesquieu’s reason for favoring separation was that a rule-making
judge could change the rules upon seeing who the parties were,
producing an arbitrary outcome. The lesson Montesquieu failed to
learn about the common law system is that any judge may do this –
separation from the legislature does not stop the rules being made up
by a judge through exposition. Thus separation of those who
adjudicate law from formal lawmaking bodies is pointless. Disputing
parties have no reason to prefer rules made up by a judge who does
nothing else over rules made up by a judge who moonlights in a
legislature. In either case the change is retroactive. And either case
presents an equal risk of unprincipled discrimination, against which
other constitutional safeguards may be necessary. A judge may be as
likely to change the rules mid-stream through exposition, and can do
so just as readily, whether he also legislates in another way or not. 
The best protections from invidiously discriminatory
adjudication are recusal rules and the doctrine of precedent (“what I
decide today applies to similar stories tomorrow”). A repeat-playing
adjudicator need be no less subject to recusal rules, and is no less
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 U.S. Const. Art. I § 9 cl. 3; § 10 cl. 1. (Both Congress and state legislatures92
are prohibited from enacting bills of attainder.)
 I Blackstone, op cit n. 11, 259: “Were it [the judicial power] joined with the93
legislative, the life, liberty, and property, of the subject would be in the hands of
arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then regulated only by their own
opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law; which, though legislators
may depart from, yet judges are bound to observe.” Blackstone elsewhere argued
that if “the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands, the former will
take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power, as may tend to the
subversion of it’s [sic] own independence, and therewith of the liberty of the
subject.” (Id., 142.) But preserving incentives to enact statutory detail does not
require that legislators be kept individually uninvolved in judicial (or other
executive) lawmaking. The mere fact that some participants in the legislative
enactment process may later participate in judicial (or other executive) exposition
of laws does not deprive the legislature as a whole of incentive to enact detailed
provisions. Even where the legislature qua legislature is empowered to supervise
judicial (or other executive) lawmaking, today’s legislators still maximize their
collective influence on the law by corralling the effective allocation of expository
lawmaking power to their successors. 
subject to the doctrine of precedent, because he happens to help make
law in a different way (namely, by enacting legislation) in his spare
time. Because formal enactment of legislation is not subject to the
doctrine of precedent, however, it is an inappropriate vehicle for
adjudication, and wise constitution-writers would proscribe its use for
that purpose.  The doctrine of precedent is what remains of the pre-92
realist vision of “fundamental principles of law; which, though
legislators may depart from, yet judges are bound to observe.”93
Checks and balances promote liberty because they are
fashioned on an assumption about human nature that we intuitively
and empirically know to be sound. The assumption is that every
political actor will seek to maximize his own political influence. That
assumption is less sordid than it may seem. We draw it first from our
own palpable need to have our lives seem as meaningful to us as
possible. On that assumption, a dual-track (judicial and legislative)
lawmaker has equal incentive to respect stare decisis in his judicial
capacity as does someone who makes law on the judicial track alone.
His incentive is the maximization of his influence on the law. 
Every judicial lawmaker maximizes his influence by showing
29
Claus:
Published by Digital USD, 2004
29
 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (O’Connor, Kennedy, and94
Souter, JJ.)
 Practice Direction (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L.): “...95
Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may
lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper
development of the law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice
and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart
from a previous decision when it appears right to do so.”
 Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 96
 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. V. Parrish, (1937) (overruling Adkins v.97
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)
(overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (effectively overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896)).
respect for stare decisis. Systemic respect for that doctrine is what turns
exposition into lawmaking. Regardless of whether or not he also
makes law in another way, a judicial lawmaker’s expository power
turns upon expounding within a system that takes past expositions
seriously. Regardless of whether or not he also makes law in another
way, a judicial lawmaker will want to maximize his judicial
lawmaking power. He does this by promoting through his public
reasoning a respect for and deference to stare decisis that maximizes
the odds of his own expositions being followed. Against this
necessary show of respect for stare decisis, the influence-maximizing
judicial lawmaker will balance his desire to depart from some
expositions of his predecessors, a goal he will achieve primarily
through dextrous distinguishing and occasionally through the crude
mechanism of overruling. That dual-track lawmakers have another
way to influence the law may actually make them less inclined to
endanger the authority of expositions through “frequent
overruling.”  The House of Lords’ exercise of appellate jurisdiction94
certainly comports with this speculation. Until 1966, the Law Lords
did not acknowledge that they might ever overrule prior decisions,95
in striking contrast to the United States Supreme Court’s wholesale
overruling of Lochner-era  precedent during the preceding decades.96 97
And dual-track lawmakers need be no less able craftsmen of
precedent than are solely-judicial lawmakers. As the Law Lords have
30
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 11 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art11
30
 Consistent with his praise for the English separation of fact-finding from98
execution and the English assignment of the fact-finding function to juries,
Montesquieu observed that “in monarchies” such as France, it was “a very great
inconvenience” for “ministers of the prince to sit as judges.” Though “[m]any are
the reflections that here arise,” Montesquieu chose only to mention one, and it was
not the critical issue of conflict-of-interest: “There is in the very nature of things a
kind of contrast between the prince’s council and his courts of judicature. The
king’s council ought to be composed of a few persons, and the courts of judicature
of a great many. The reason is, in the former, things should be conducted and
undertaken with a kind of warmth and passion, which can hardly be expected, but
from four or five men who make it their sole business. On the contrary, in courts
of judicature a certain coolness is requisite, and an indifference, in some measure,
to all manner of affairs.” Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk. VI Ch. VI, 91. The closest
Montesquieu came to the conflict-of-interest point was in observing that the
monarch should not personally adjudicate: “In monarchies, the prince is the party
that prosecutes the person accused, and causes him to be punished or acquitted;
now were he himself to sit upon the trial, he would be both judge and party. ...
Farther, by this method, he would deprive himself of the most glorious attribute of
sovereignty, namely, that of granting pardon; for it would be quite ridiculous of
him to make and unmake his decisions: surely he would not choose to contradict
himself. (Id., Ch. V, 88-89.)
been for much of their history, dual-track lawmakers may be engaged
legislators, who debate merits of legislation and vote on the floor of
a legislative chamber, and simultaneously, sophisticated jurists.
(c.) Kinds of power must be internally divided to prevent
actors from determining conclusively the reach of
their own powers
Separating judges’ execution of the law from the executive
government matters as much as separating juries’ adjudication of facts
from that government. Montesquieu did not see this,  but Blackstone98
did. “For this reason, by the statute 16 Car. I. c. 10. which abolished
the court of star chamber, effectual care is taken to remove all judicial
power out of the hands of the king’s privy council; who, as then was
evident from the recent instances, might soon be inclined to
pronounce that for law, which was most agreeable to the prince or his
officers. Nothing therefore is more to be avoided, in a free
constitution, than uniting the provinces of a judge and a minister of
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  I Blackstone, op cit n. 11, 260.99
 The jurisdiction of France’s Conseil constitutionnel falls within the100
formal lawmaking process. See John Bell, French Constitutional Law, 1992, Section
1.3.
state.”  99
Montesquieu’s perception that sustainable division of power
could occur only along essentialist lines obscured the most important
way that dividing and sharing power promotes the liberty of the
citizen. Dividing and sharing power among actors may prevent an
actor from determining conclusively the reach of his own power,
regardless of whether the actor’s power is of a law-executing or a
lawmaking kind. That result depends upon others possessing the
power to supervise and check the actor’s exercise of power. 
Checks and balances may be participatory or expository.
Participatory checks and balances, like a chief executive’s decision
whether to sign legislation, a legislature’s decision whether to endorse
executive appointments, or, indeed, the intra-institutional
apportionment of power among members of a legislature or a court,
make the exercise of power depend upon concerted action by multiple
actors. Expository checks and balances, by which  actors expound the
laws that confer and limit other actors’ powers, may similarly be
conditions precedent to action  or may be triggered by ex post100
challenge to that action. Ex post exposition is lawmaking in the course
of execution, but the liberty of the citizen is directly promoted by
separating that expository lawmaking-in-execution from the
lawmaking and executive powers that are the subject of exposition.
The critical liberty-promoting criterion for separation is not whether
powers differ in kind, but whether apportionment will prevent actors
from conclusively determining the reach of their own powers.
If the adjudicator of disputes between the executive
government and the citizen were not separate from the executive
government, then that government would conclusively determine the
reach of its powers, and could do as it pleased. If the adjudicator of
disputes concerning the reach of a legislative body’s powers were the
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 A “faithful agent” characterization of British judges’ role is more apt than101
such a characterization of their American counterparts’ exercise of power to
interpret statutes, for the Americans receive their expository power not from
Congress but directly from ”the People” through Article III of the Constitution. See
Section 6 infra. Cf. William N. Eskridge, All About Words: Early Understandings
legislative body itself, or some subset of that body, then the legislative
body would likewise conclusively determine the reach of its powers,
and could do as it pleased. This is not an objection to members of
legislative bodies also exercising judicial lawmaking powers, but
merely an objection to those bodies, or subsets of those bodies, having
the particular judicial lawmaking power to expound the reach of their
own legislation-enacting powers.
In fashioning checks and balances to prevent political actors
from conclusively determining the reach of their own powers,
constitution-makers ultimately run up against the need in every
political order for an ultimate, unsupervised lawmaker – a
constitutional lawmaker, in other words. Being unchecked, the
constitutional lawmaker is omnipotent. But that constitutional
lawmaker may be configured to minimize the risk it poses to liberty.
(d.) Delegations of any kind of power can and should be
supervised
The constitutional source of judicial lawmaking power has a
capacity, and perhaps should be understood to have an obligation, to
supervise those to whom it has delegated that judicial lawmaking
power.
5. The British reforms reconsidered 
Since the Judicature Acts of 1873-75, the English courts have
been unambiguously the creatures of legislation. Their power to
decide questions of law, and thus to make law, is a delegated
lawmaking power, and the delegating lawmaker is Parliament. In
expounding law, judges do not fulfil a function separate from
lawmaking, but rather, they act as the lawmakers’ agents, as needed,
in the course of applying law.  If the lawmakers could have101
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of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev.
990 (2001); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum.
L. Rev. 1 (2001).
 See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, op cit n. 87.102
 Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876.103
 See, e.g. § 23 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, discussed by Lord104
Russell of Killowen, C.J., in Kruse v. Johnson [1898] 2 Q.B. 91, which empowered
local corporations to make by-laws, but provided that no by-law would come into
force “until the expiration of forty days after a copy sealed with the corporate seal
has been sent to the Secretary of State; and if within those forty days the Queen,
with the advice of her Privy Council, disallows a proposed by-law or part thereof,
such by-law, or such part, shall not come into force, and the Queen may, within the
provided in the text of their law whatever detail the judges’
exposition adds, should not the lawmakers also supervise the judicial
addition,  and edit it where necessary?102
The framework for analysis, then, is not separation of kinds of
power, for the enquiry concerns two subspecies of the same kind of
power, two methods of lawmaking – formal enactment versus
precedent-based elaboration, whether the latter be by reference to
exogenous authoritative texts or by reference to texts authoritatively
generated within the judicial system. For purposes of its lawmaking
character, the propensity of adjudication to resolve a dispute between
particular parties is irrelevant – an advisory jurisdiction within the
courts would raise the same issue. And the issue is the proper method
of supervising a delegation of lawmaking power.
When Parliament delegates lawmaking power to another body,
may it also assign into third hands a power to supervise exercise of
the delegation? That is, effectively, what Parliament did in 1876 when
it confirmed the House of Lords’ ultimate appellate jurisdiction atop
the newly-reorganized judiciary.  And that is what Parliament has103
long done in relation to other delegations of lawmaking power. When
Parliament delegates power to make regulations, ordinances, and by-
laws to subordinate agencies and corporations, it often assigns a
supervisory power to the monarch (acting, of course, on the advice of
ministers who hold the confidence of Parliament)  or even to the104
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forty days, enlarge the time within which the by-law shall not come into force.”
  See, e.g., § 115 of the Public Health Act 1848, considered in Marshall v.105
Smith (1873) 8 C.P. 416, which empowered local boards of health to make by-laws,
but provided that those by-laws would “not be of any force or effect unless and
until the same be submitted to and confirmed by one of Her Majesty’s principal
secretaries of state, who is hereby impowered to allow or disallow the same, as he
shall think proper.”
 Human Rights Act 1998 § 3.106
 Id.,  § 4.107
 Id., § 10.108
holder of a particular ministerial office.  The supervisor is normally105
empowered to disallow exercises of the delegated lawmaking power,
but there is no reason in principle why she may not be empowered to
substitute her own judgment for that of the primary delegate. 
Rather than leave supervision of delegated lawmaking solely
to Parliament’s own cumbersome legislative process, Parliament may
assign the task of scrutiny to particular persons who are more directly
accountable than is the delegate lawmaker. In the case of lawmaking
delegation to executive agencies and corporations, the usual
supervisor is a member of Parliament who has been appointed to the
ministry because she holds the confidence of Parliament. In the case
of lawmaking delegation to the courts, the supervisor is a committee
of Parliament, the members of which were appointed to the House of
Lords because of their suitability to supervise judicial lawmaking.
Their appointment by the monarch reflected a judgment of suitability
made by ministers who have Parliament’s confidence.
Under the Human Rights Act 1998, the British judiciary is
obliged “[s]o far as it is possible to do so” to construe legislation “in
a way which is compatible” with the guarantees of the European
Convention on Human Rights.  Moreover, the higher courts are106
empowered to declare acts of Parliament incompatible with the
Convention, and such declarations permit ministers to remedy the107
incompatibility by amending the legislation.  In proposing to108
remove the House of Lords’ appellate jurisdiction, the British
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Department of Constitutional Affairs Consultation Paper, Constitutional109
Reform: A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, 2003, ¶2.
  Conversely, the corrupting influence of election campaign contributions110
is no less likely to be felt by judicial lawmakers who have been elected to judicial
office than it is by judicial lawmakers who have been elected to legislative bodies.
There is no principled reason for a political system not to incorporate equally-
elaborate measures to guard against bribery of judges and to guard against bribery
of legislators.
Government has observed:
It is essential that our systems do all that
they can to minimise the danger that
judges’ decisions could be perceived to be
politically motivated. The Human Rights
Act 1998, itself the product of a changing
climate of opinion, has made people more
sensitive to the issues and more aware of
the anomaly of the position whereby the
highest court of appeal is situated within
one of the chambers of Parliament.109
The British Government does not explicate the evil of political
motivation. The corrupting influence of political patronage is no more
likely to be felt when judicial lawmakers sit with life tenure in the
House of Lords than when they sit in a separate Supreme Court. If
anyone were irrationally to suspect it more, the remedy is education,
not the indulgence of delusions.  But if by political motivation the110
British Government means policy choice among competing human
interests, then the presence of that phenomenon in the process of
judicial lawmaking is not just likely, it is certain. And that is so
regardless of institutional design.
The lawmaking to which the courts are summoned by the
Human Rights Act differs from the lawmaking in which they have
always engaged not in the extent to which it rests on policy choice,
but in the extent to which that policy choice is transparent and likely
to evoke public controversy. Adjudicating the apportionment of
powers under devolution legislation may prove similarly
36
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 See Scotland Act 1998 §§ 33, 102, 103, Schedule VI; Government of Wales111
Act 1998  Schedule VIII; Northern Ireland Act 1998  §§ 11, 81, 82, Schedule X. The
Law Lords currently adjudicate devolution issues as members of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. The British Government proposes to transfer that
jurisdiction to the new Supreme Court. (See Department of Constitutional Affairs
Consultation Paper, Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United
Kingdom, 2003, ¶21.) The current Law Lords oppose that proposal because the
Judicial Committee more readily accommodates ad hoc participation by judges
from the devolved jurisdictions. (Law Lords’ response to the Government’s
Consultation Paper on Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United
Kingdom, October 27, 2003, ¶ 9.)
 Blackstone even found support in the writings of Sir Edward Coke for112
the conclusion that Parliament was omnipotent. See I Blackstone, op cit n. 11, 156.
 See, e.g., May v. Beattie [1927] 2 K.B. 353 (discussing a minister’s113
regulation-making power, subject to parliamentary disallowance, under the London
Traffic Act 1924).
controversial.  Yet Parliament, as ultimate lawmaker, retains the111
capacity to resolve all policy controversy through its own legislative
choices.  Where Parliament has delegated lawmaking policy choice112
to the courts, there is no principled reason for Parliament not to
supervise courts’ exercise of the delegated lawmaking power through
a suitably-constituted committee. And that is precisely what
Parliament currently does. When Parliament debates whether its laws
should change in response to a judicial decision that those laws are
incompatible with the judges’ exposition of the European Convention
on Human Rights, should the judges’ presence be viewed as a
constitutional infirmity? Might it not be a constitutional strength? In
exercising the delegated lawmaking authority to decide questions of
law, an ultimate appellate body has no more need of separation from
the delegating lawmaker than does a minister in exercising the
delegated lawmaking authority to make regulations.  Ministers’113
participation in parliamentary debate is universally considered a
virtue, one of the checks on their exercise of delegated powers. Why
should judges’ participation be viewed differently? The intuitive
objection seems to owe more to aesthetics than to political principle.
Montesquieu’s only reasons for separating judicial power
concerned the protection of litigants. As Lord Hobhouse observed in
his supplementary response to the British Government’s Consultation
37
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 Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, Supplementary Response to the114
Government’s consultation paper on Constitutional reform, November 7, 2003, D.1.
Hobhouse concluded that “[i]t is a serious flaw in the Consultation Paper that,
insofar as it adopts any constitutional principle, it appears to choose the doctrine
of the separation of powers,” which he described as “a doctrine based on a
mistaken analysis of the British constitution developed by French thinkers in the
18  century.” ( Id., D2.) The Lord Chancellor’s concurrent capacities to sit in theth
Cabinet and in the Lords’ Appellate Committee does, however, deserve criticism
for its potential to prejudice litigants where the Executive is, directly or indirectly,
a party-in-interest.
 U.S. Const. Preamble.115
 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1690. See also Johannes116
Althusius, Politica methodice digesta, 1603.
 James Wilson most famously articulated this explanation of the process117
of deliberation and adoption during a speech at the Pennsylvania Ratification
Convention on December 1, 1787, recorded in II Jonathan Elliot, The Debates of the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 2  ed.,nd
Paper, the separation that truly makes a difference to litigants is the
separation between judiciary and executive, to the extent that
adjudication involves “making determinations in favour of or against
the Executive.”  That is the separation that prevents those who hold114
the force of the community from conclusively determining their
power to use that force against citizens. As his Lordship implied, the
right recognized by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights to have rights and liabilities adjudicated by “an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law” really concerns
independence from the executive; no body “established by law” is
truly independent of the lawmaker. 
6. The American Experience
The United States Constitution recognizes as ultimate
lawmaker not a Parliament, but “the People.”  Seizing on the115
Lockean proposition that all government depends on the tacit consent
of the governed, who are ultimately sovereign,  the American116
founders contrived to convene the sovereign people for long enough
to create an ultimate law.  That law purported to divide power along117
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1881, 443 et seq. It was the reason that the Federal Convention referred the
proposed constitution to especially-chosen conventions rather than to the state
legislatures, in disregard of Art. XIII of the Articles of Confederation: see James
Madison’s arguments for doing so and the resolution of the convention in II Max
Farrand, (ed.), The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 2  ed., 1937, 93 andnd
476 (Madison’s notes) and 665. See also Wood, op cit n. 15, 524-536; Bruce
Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, 1991.
 See Section 1, supra. For Montesquieu, the virtue of a république fédérative118
lay in the extent to which it could overcome disadvantages of the small scale to
which he believed republican government was inevitably confined. His conclusion
that a truly republican government could endure only over a small space of
territory necessarily implied that the federation of republican governments that he
had in mind could not amount to a republican government over the whole. See
Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk.IX Ch 1, 145: “If a republic be small, it is destroyed by
a foreign force; if it be large, it is ruined by an internal imperfection. ... The evil is
in the very thing itself, and no form can redress it. It is, therefore, very probable that
mankind would have been, at length, obliged to live constantly under the
government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that
has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of
a monarchical, government. I mean a confederate republic.” In a foedus (treaty)-
based constitutional order, ultimate lawmaking and law-executing powers stayed
in the member states, from which the federal actor’s powers were delegated. That
had been the character of American governance under the Articles of
Confederation. Speaking of American governance under the Constitution, Alexis
de Tocqueville observed: “Here the term Federal Government is clearly no longer
applicable ...: a form of government has been found out which is neither exactly
national nor federal; but no further progress has been made, and the new word
which will one day designate this novel invention does not yet exist.” I Alexis de
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (Reeve translation), 3   ed., 1838, 186.rd
 In Hamilton’s words: “The general power whatever be its form if it119
preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers otherwise it will be swallowed
up by them. ... Two Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same limits.” (Address
to the Convention, June 18, 1787, in I Farrand 2  ed., op cit n. 117, 287 (Madison’snd
essentialist lines among three branches of a new government. But that
law also purported to divide power in a way that Montesquieu and
other Enlightenment scholars had thought unsustainable.  The118
powers to make and to execute law were each internally divided
between the new government and existing state governments. The
durability of that division was doubted, even by its principal
proponents at Philadelphia.  Its prospects for endurance depended119
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notes).) At the 1787 Convention, Madison was content to say: “Were it practicable
for the Genl. Govt. to extend its care to every requisite object without the
cooperation of the State Govts. the people would not be less free as members of one
great Republic than as members of thirteen small ones. ... Supposing therefore a
tendency in the Genl. Government to absorb the State Govts. no fatal consequence
could result.” (June 21, 1787, in id., 357-358 (Madison’s notes). See also Madison’s
speech on June 29: id. 471 (Yates's notes, corroborated by King's notes at 477 and by
Madison's modification of his own notes by reference to Yates's at 464 (see n. 2).)
In a letter to W.C. Rives dated October 21, 1833, Madison impugned the accuracy
of Yates's notes in relation to that speech: III id. 521-524.
 U.S. Const. Art. I § 1.120
 U.S. Const. Art. III.121
 Id., § 2 cl. 2: “... the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both122
as to Law and Fact....”
 Id.123
 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 219-223; Wood, op cit n. 15,124
453-463.
on protective mechanisms set forth in the text that created it.
Congress’s laws would be supreme over the laws of the states, but to
be enacted, those laws had to pass a Senate chosen by state
legislatures, and to be successfully executed, those laws had to
conform to a life-tenured judiciary’s exposition of the Constitution’s
division of powers.
In the exercise of “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted,”120
Congress has no authority even to supervise the courts’ exposition of
its own acts, for Congress is not the source of the courts’ expository
power. That judicial lawmaking power is directly delegated by the
People.  The People delegated “[t]he judicial Power” to courts in121
words that clearly embraced deciding questions of law.  Congress’s122
power to regulate the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction  does123
not let Congress take to itself the exercise of judicial lawmaking
power.   Once Congress has settled on the words of an act and has124
passed that act, Congress loses all control over the law of that act. If
Congress is dissatisfied with the judicially-elaborated law of its acts,
recourse lies only through further direct Congressional lawmaking.
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 The parallel segment of lawmaking power that is exercised when the125
Executive chooses to expound the meaning of uncontested existing law in the
course of executing that law is assigned to the Executive branch. Even when law is
undisputed, executing it may involve public reasoning about its meaning that
effectively expands the corpus of the law. See Symposium: Executive Branch
Interpretation of the Law, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 21-523 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J.
217 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi, Government Lawyering: The President, the
Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 61 Law & Contemp. Prob. 61 (1998). Judicial
choice to defer to such executive expositions (see Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)) mirrors judicial enforcement of
regulations adopted by the executive pursuant to explicit Congressional delegations
of rulemaking power.
The Constitution thus divides lawmaking power between the enacters
of authoritative texts and those called upon to resolve later disputes
concerning the meaning of those authoritative texts. The difference
between ex ante exposition (through statutory detail) and ex post
exposition (through opinions resolving disputes) is not substantive,
it is merely contextual. The power of articulating law straddles its
formal enactment, but that formality affords a ready criterion for
apportioning the power.
Article III of the United States Constitution achieves not a
separation of distinguishable kinds of power within Montesquieu’s
tripartite schema, but a segmentation of one kind of power among
actors. When the Constitution invests Congress with power to enact
laws and the Supreme Court with power to adjudicate disputes as to
law or fact arising under those laws, the document segments the
exercise of lawmaking power into enactment and expository phases.
Its implied definition of legislative power in Article I is narrower than
Montesquieu’s, though still essentialist, while its implied definition of
judicial power reaches an enquiry that Montesquieu failed to
contemplate adequately. The segment of lawmaking power that is
exercised in the course of deciding disputes about the meaning of
existing law is assigned exclusively to a class of adjudicators.  In125
their hands it is mixed with the fact-finding function that
Montesquieu called the power of judging. Article III judges thus have
a share in all three of Montesquieu’s powers – finding facts,
articulating law, and executing the law so articulated on the facts so
found. As other actors enjoy pieces of these powers in other contexts,
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 See Federalist No. 47 (Madison); IV Jonathan Elliot (ed.), The Debates in126
the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 2nd ed.,
1888, 121-122 (Davie, North Carolina). Montesquieu, however, thought liberty
would be lost if “the same person” possessed “a share in both”  the affirmative
exercise of legislative power and the affirmative exercise of executive power. See
Montesquieu, op cit n. 2, Bk. XI Ch. VI, 179.
 See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).127
 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation128
Doctrine, 69 U.Chi.L.Rev.1721, 1723 (2002). Cf. Larry Alexander and Saikrishna
Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated,
70 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1297 (2003).
 U.S. Const. Arts. I §1, II §1, III §1.129
the theory of checked separation is arguably not violated, as Madison
and others explained to the founding generation.126
(a.) Essentialist Separation: Unnecessary and
Unaccomplished
Though the American founders implicitly differed from
Montesquieu’s classification of legislative and judicial powers, theirs,
like his, was essentialist, not institutional.  Some academic127
commentators have contended that when, for example, Congress
explicitly delegates rulemaking power to an executive department,
the power so delegated is, ipso facto, executive power.  Montesquieu128
conceived that government involved three essentially different
activities, and observed that human wellbeing might be promoted by
assigning those activities to different actors. Those propositions
preceded his written exploration of British institutions. Within the
structure of his argument, the configuration of British governance
served only to show that his theory of liberty-maximizing
government could be implemented. Lawmaking does not cease to be
lawmaking because the person who does it wears a label other than
lawmaker. Likewise, when the American founders assigned “[a]ll
legislative Powers,” “the executive Power” and “the judicial Power,”129
to Congress, President, and courts respectively, they did not think
that they were being tautologous. They thought they were investing
three powers with differing a priori natures in particular institutional
42
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 See Section 3, supra.130
 “[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that131
in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives.”  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
(Blackmun, J., opinion of the Court.)
 “Congress’ authority to delegate portions of its power to administrative132
agencies provides no support for the argument that Congress can constitutionally
control administration of the laws by way of a Congressional veto.” INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 953 n. 16 (1983). (Burger, C.J., opinion of the Court.)
 “The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of133
powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government.” Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). (Blackmun, J., opinion of the Court.) “The whole
theory of lawful congressional `delegation’ is not that Congress is sometimes too
busy or too divided and can therefore assign its responsibility of making law to
someone else; but rather that a certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking,
inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the relative
actors. The design of those actors did not affect the natures of the
powers that they received. On the contrary, the natures of the powers
to be invested determined the founders’ institutional design.  130
The Constitution’s essentialist separation has proved
unworkable under even a narrow conception of legislative power that
distinguishes explicit Congressional delegation of rulemaking power
from executive exposition of existing law. This distinction, which the
Constitution seems to make, is formal, not substantive, for executive
exercise of explicitly-delegated rulemaking power and executive
exposition of existing law may each produce identically-worded
regulation. Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court has waved through
explicit Congressional delegations of rulemaking power to executive
departments and agencies.  Yet the Court has balked at devices131
deployed by Congress to supervise the conduct of executive
departments and agencies.  As that mix of outcomes reveals, the132
Court’s concern is not simply delegatus non potest delegare, though
Congress, unlike the British Parliament, is de jure a delegate of
lawmaking power. The Court’s perplexity derives mainly from the
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specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to determine – up to a point –
how small or how large that degree shall be.” Id., 417. (Scalia, J., dissenting.)
 “Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government134
has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great
provinces the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges and
powers of the different legislative branches. ... All new laws, though penned with
the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation,
are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.
Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection
of the human faculties, the medium through which the conceptions of men are
conveyed to each other adds fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to express
ideas. ... But no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every
complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different
ideas.” (Federalist No. 37 (Madison).) “Laws are a dead letter without courts to
expound and define their true meaning and operation.” (Federalist No. 22
(Hamilton).)
 Conflation of political theories that were not fully compatible was135
widespread feature of discourse in Revolutionary and Founding era America. For
example: “Without being fully aware of the significance of what they were doing,
the opponents of the new Constitution [of Pennsylvania of 1776] mingled Addison’s
defense of mixed government with Montesquieu’s reference to separation of
powers as the most authoritative indictment of the unicameralism of the
Pennsylvania legislature they could find.” (Wood, op cit n. 15, 450.)
The Supreme Court has failed to articulate coherent principles
that define Congress’s ability both to delegate lawmaking power and
to supervise departments’ and agencies’ exercise of power. That
failure reflects the inaptitude of the Constitution’s essentialist
separation of powers. Unlike Montesquieu, the more insightful among
the American founders understood the lawmaking aspects of
execution, albeit especially of judicial execution.  And unlike134
Montesquieu, the American founders thought that dividing
lawmaking power might actually work and was worth trying. Yet in
fashioning their new federal government, they deferred to
Montesquieu’s essentialism. Their vision of relevant political
principles was inadequately integrated.  135
Montesquieu had thought himself hamstrung by the
indivisibility of sovereignty when proposing a liberty-promoting
separation of powers. The American founders’ division of legislative
44
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 Mass. Const. 1780, Part the First, Art. XXX: “In the government of this136
Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and
judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative
and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a
government of laws and not of men.”
 Cf. The Executive’s power to expound the law of the Constitution in the137
course of deciding how to act: see Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40
Cas. W. Res. 905 (1990); Symposium: Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law,
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 21-523 (1993); Gary Lawson and Christopher D. Moore, The
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267 (1996);
Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable
and executive powers between national and state governments defied
claims that those powers could not be internally divided. Yet if those
powers could be internally divided, then every division of powers
could have been directly keyed to promoting liberty and the rule of
law. Every division of powers could have been directly designed
around the simple criterion that political actors should not
conclusively determine the reach of their own powers. Comparative
constitutional experience since 1787 demonstrates that an essentialist
separation between all lawmaking on one hand and all law-executing
on the other is neither sufficient nor necessary to promote liberty and
the rule of law. Moreover, such a separation is not actually attainable.
Founding era constitutive documents, such as the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, proclaimed an essentialist principle that was
both impossible and a false fit for the object they sought to achieve,136
and Montesquieu was the culprit. Liberty and the rule of law are,
however, aptly served by any and all constitutional checks and
balances that minimize opportunities for political actors to determine
conclusively the reach of their own powers. Those values are
furthered, not undermined, by Congress’s deployment of devices less
cumbersome than formal enactment to supervise its explicit
delegations of rulemaking power.
(b.) Lawmaking Segmentation and the Limits of Supervision
Under Article III, the United States Supreme Court’s
unsupervised lawmaking power extends beyond the law of
Congress’s acts to the law of the Constitution.  The constitutional137
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Statutes, 63 Law & Contemp. Prob. 7 (2000). That constitutional law-making power
is supervised by a combination of electoral accountability and judicial review,
backed by Congress’s power of impeachment.
 II Max Farrand (ed.), The Records of the Federal Convention, 1911, 186-7138
(Madison’s notes).
 Id., 183-5.139
 Id., 401 (Madison’s notes).140
 Id., 430 (Madison’s notes). The convention also agreed that day without141
recorded discussion to a motion by Madison and Gouvernor Morris explicitly
adding controversies to which the United States was a party to the Court’s
jurisdiction.
text that most firmly undergirds the Court’s power to expound
constitutional meaning was inserted very late in the life of the
Philadelphia Convention, and Madison’s notes suggest that its
significance was not well appreciated. The draft that had been
reported by the Committee of Detail on August 6, more than two
months into the Convention, seemed not to empower the Court to
decide constitutional questions. The proposed Court’s jurisdiction was
to extend “to all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of
the United States” and to a range of cases and controversies defined
by specific subject matter or party, but the Court’s power to decide
controversies between states did not include power to decide
controversies concerning territory or jurisdiction.  In respect of those138
sensitive questions, the Senate was empowered to establish ad hoc
tribunals to resolve particular disputes.  On August 24, the provision139
for ad hoc tribunals was struck out as, in John Rutledge’s words,
“rendered unnecessary by the National Judiciary now to be
established,”  and on August 27, three weeks before the convention’s140
conclusion, “Docr. Johnson moved to insert the words `this
Constitution and the’” before the word `laws’.”  Madison’s notes141
then record the following:
Mr Madison doubted whether it
was not going too far to extend the
jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases
arising Under the Constitution, &
46




 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Nixon v. United States, 506143
U.S. 224 (1993). Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
 Advisory opinions generated within the Executive that establish norms144
governing executive conduct are, by contrast, subject to supervision through
judicial review.
whether it ought not to be limited to cases
of a Judiciary Nature. The right of
expounding the Constitution in cases not
of this nature ought not to be given to
that Department. 
The motion of Docr. Johnson was
agreed to nem: con: it being generally
supposed that the jurisdiction given was
constructively limited to cases of a
Judiciary nature – 142
Whatever did this mean? Perhaps it provides early support for a
political question doctrine.  But a distinction between constitutional143
concepts suitable for judicial exposition and constitutional concepts
inherently unsuitable for such exposition would surely have
provoked more discussion. More likely, given Madison’s regard for
Montesquieu’s characterization of powers, the reference to “Judiciary
nature” was meant and understood to condemn advisory opinions.
Madison probably meant that the federal courts should be limited to
adjudicating genuine disputes between parties-in-interest.
Why was Madison averse to advisory opinions? An instinctive
objection may have been to the judicial lawmaking that they involve.
Advisory opinions concerning the law of the Constitution would be
beyond the power of Congress to remedy.  But the lawmaking that144
occurs when a court gives an advisory opinion is substantively
identical to the lawmaking that occurs when a court publishes its
reasons for deciding actively-disputed questions of law the way it did.
In each case, the court makes law through exposition. Exposition is
elaboration, and elaboration is lawmaking. The abstract form of
advisory opinions just renders their lawmaking character more
47
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 Though judicial supremacy flowed from the Constitution’s creation of145
an unchecked judiciary, this consequence was far from universally appreciated at
the Founding. See Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4
(2001); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, PartOne:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 333 (1998).
transparent. What evil did Madison think he was guarding against
when he sought to limit judicial exposition of the Constitution to
adjudicating genuine disputes? Did he think that he was somehow
confining the consequences of judicial exposition to the parties in
dispute? Had the issue of who should have ultimate responsibility for
expounding the Constitution come to the Convention’s attention
earlier in the proceedings, perhaps the delegates’ reflection on the
subject would have prompted them to establish an appellate check on
and supervision of the constitutional lawmaking that is an inevitable
concomitant of deciding constitutional disputes.145
During the public debate over ratification in New York State,
Alexander Hamilton robustly countered the complaint that such a
check was needed. His antifederalist opponents had identified the
constitutional flaw.
The authority of the proposed Supreme
Court of the United States, which is to be
a separate and independent body, will be
superior to that of the legislature. The
power of construing the laws according to
the spirit of the Constitution, will enable
that court to mould them into whatever
shape it may think proper; especially as
its decisions will not be in any manner
subject to the revision or correction of the
legislative body. This is as unprecedented
as it is dangerous. In Britain, the judicial
power, in the last resort, resides in the
House of Lords, which is a branch of the
legislature; and this part of the British
government has been imitated in the State
constitutions in general. The Parliament
48
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 Federalist No. 78.150
of Great Britain, and the legislatures of
the several States, can at any time rectify,
by law, the exceptionable decisions of
their respective courts. But the errors and
usurpations of the Supreme Court of the
United States will be uncontrollable and
remediless.146
Hamilton responded that legislators who had passed unconstitutional
laws would not be “disposed to repair the breach in the character of
judges.”  That fact certainly counted against letting a legislature147
supervise constitutional review of its own laws. A simple legislative
override would indeed subvert “the general theory of a limited
Constitution.”  But did it follow that life-tenured judicial lawmakers148
were best left unsupervised? Under the general theory of a limited
Constitution, would those judicial lawmakers not then be rendered
constitution-makers?
Hamilton deprecated the enquiry. The “supposed danger of
judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority” was “in reality
a phantom.”  In his famous phrase, the judiciary would “have149
neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments.”  This was, of course, nonsense, and his ensuing citation150
of Montesquieu a mischievous exploitation of the French theorist’s
inadequate understanding of common law adjudication and of the
doctrine of precedent. Unless in a perverse or nullifying mood, juries
have only judgment, for their factfinding has no significance beyond
the outcome for the parties before them, and the legal rules applied to
their factfinding are exogenously established. Judges have will.
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 Attributed to Justice William J. Brennan: Bernard Schwartz, Decision:151
How the Supreme Court Decides Cases, 1996, 6; James E. Simon, The Center Holds:
The Power Struggle Inside the Rehnquist Supreme Court, 1995, 54, quoting Nat
Hentoff, Profiles: The Constitutionalist, New Yorker, March 12, 1990, 45, 60. 
 Federalist No. 78.152
 Id.: “no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like.”153
Through their articulations of legal principle and their exposition of
authoritative legal text they will the law into being, as surely as
legislators do when they vote on bills. A common law adjudicator
may wield the doctrine of precedent very wilfully indeed. And in a
system that apportioned legislative and executive powers within a
national government and between that government and state
governments, the only alternative to according force to judicial
exercises of will would be civil war. The system deferred to no other
will for determining the reach of Congress’s power. Each of the
branches and levels of government would have their capacity to act
held hostage to the will of the judges, unchecked. Only through the
appointments process and the impeachment power could holders of
elective office influence the shape of the judicial will, and those were
hardly apt vehicles for the task. Anyone who understood the nature
of common law adjudication, particularly application of the doctrine
of precedent to judicial interpretation of authoritative texts, should
have realized that they were establishing an institution where it
would someday be said: “five votes can do anything around here.”151
Hamilton belittled the fear that “courts, on the pretense of a
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature.” The possibility “if it prove any thing,
would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that
body.” The judges’ constitutional duty would be “to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.”  But152
Hamilton offered no criteria for interpretive orthodoxy, for legitimate
exposition, beyond his allusion to “the manifest tenor” of the
Constitution. His examples of constitutional limitations  that judges153
would conclusively apply were, like those given by Marshall in
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 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). Marshall’s skillful self-denial of power154
to issue writs of mandamus asserted  in the mildest manner imaginable the Court’s
capacity to determine conclusively the reach of its own powers. (Id., 173-180.)
 The Federalist No. 78.155
 Pre-realist visions of the common law denied the centrality of judicial156
will to formation of that law. Common-law adjudication was supposed to be
constrained by judicial deference to an ethereal body of principle revealed, not
constituted, by the historic body of judicial writings. (See Black and White Taxicab
and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes, J.); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101-102 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J.).)  Appealing to that Platonic vision, Hamilton contended that
judicial exposition of a new, and newly-authoritative, text would somehow be
congruently constrained.
Marbury v. Madison,  familiar and apparently definite concepts in154
respect of which judicial mis-application of text would be so clear as
to be bad behavior warranting impeachment. Of the judicial power to
exercise will in resolving textual vagueness and ambiguity, Hamilton
said nothing. If the tenor of the Constitution were not “manifest,” if
it were truly disputed, then Hamilton offered no reason to think that
it would be determined by anything but an exercise of judicial will. In
arguing for lifetime judicial appointments, Hamilton claimed that
great legal expertise was required for appointment, because “[t]o
avoid arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to
define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes
before them; and ...the records of those precedents must unavoidably
swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and
laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them.” Like155
Montesquieu, but without Montesquieu’s excuse, Hamilton, and later
Marshall, publicly characterized judicial application of law as
syllogistic.156
At the Philadelphia Convention, Hamilton had advocated
lifetime appointments for obvious policymakers, namely the president
and members of the upper chamber, aspiring to imitate the British
system as closely as possible. At Philadelphia he had been alone in
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 I Farrand, op cit n. 138, 288-89. “`The gentleman from New York is157
praised by all, but supported by no gentleman,’ observed Dr. William Samuel
Johnson.” (Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution, 1928, 228 (citing King's
notes).)
 In 1787, Iredell wrote the following in private correspondence:158
Without an express Constitution the powers of
the Legislature would undoubtedly have been
absolute (as the Parliament in Great Britain is held
to be), and any act passed not inconsistent with
natural justice (for that curb is avowed by the
judges even in England), would have been
binding on the people. 
(Griffith J. McRee, 2 Life and Correspondence of James Iredell, 1857, 172. (Emphasis
in original.)). See Sir Owen Dixon, The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional
Foundation, in Jesting Pilate, 1965, 203-213.
 See Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Coke Rep. 107 (1610).159
seeking such a New World aristocracy.  But through the judicial157
branch, he was able to achieve precisely what he had sought – a
power of almost-ultimate lawmaking for an elite cadre of lifetime
appointees.
How might the People, as true ultimate lawmakers, have
established a constitutional supervisor for the courts? The House of
Lords’ appellate jurisdiction was the model of their heritage, and
should have seemed more relevant to the American situation then
than it does now. During the ratification period, James Iredell showed
that he understood British constitutionalism to have an ultimate
common law foundation,  reflecting the view expressed in the158
seventeenth century by Sir Edward Coke that the authority of statutes
was itself a principle of the common law, a principle that might yield
to other fundamental principles of common law in some
circumstances.  The House of Lords’ appellate check on the power159
of common law courts to expound the governing principles of the
British constitution could thus have been seen as true counterpart to
any American appellate check upon the Article III courts’ power to
expound the governing principles of the United States Constitution.
But an appellate check on the power to decide a legal question is an
appropriation of the expository power, not merely a participation in
its exercise. Conferring ultimate appellate jurisdiction on a legislative
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 Angered by Chief Justice John Marshall’s conduct of Aaron Burr’s160
treason trial, Thomas Jefferson wrote: “If a member of the Executive or Legislature
does wrong, the day is never far distant when the people will remove him. They
will see then and amend the error in our Constitution, which makes any branch
independent of the nation. They will see that one of the great co-ordinate branches
of the government, setting itself in opposition to the other two, and to the common
sense of the nation, proclaims immunity to that class of offenders which endeavors
to overturn the Constitution, and are themselves protected in it by the Constitution
itself; for impeachment is a farce and will never be tried again. If their protection of
Burr produced this amendment, it will do more good than his condemnation would
have done.” (Letter to William Branch Giles, April 6, 1807, excerpted in V Dumas
Malone, Jefferson and His Time (Jefferson the President Second Term 1805-1809),
1974, 305.)
 U.S. Const. Art. I § 3 cl. 1.161
 U.S. Const. Art. V.162
body, or on a representative subset of that body, inevitably renders it
judge of its own powers, and thus functionally omnipotent. That is no
objection to the jurisdiction of the House of Lords, because
Parliament’s omnipotence has become the grundnorm of British
governance anyway. The British, through centuries of practice,
established Parliamentary supremacy. The Americans, with one
round of voting, established Judicial supremacy. Montesquieu would
have shaken his head at both outcomes.
Could the founding generation have created a government in
which three branches were kept truly co-equal?  Yes. But to do so160
they would have had to establish a mechanism for supervising
judicial lawmaking more closely and consistently than they and their
successors could ever have hoped to do through Article V’s
amendment procedure. No representative subset of Congress, voting
by simple majority, was suitable for the task. But perhaps a superset,
or a subset voting by super majority, would have been. The
Constitution at the Founding called for state legislatures to choose the
Senate.  It also enabled three-quarters of the states to amend its161
terms.  A super majority of three-quarters of the Senate might have162
been thought a sufficient proxy for the amendment process to serve
as a safeguard against judicial overreaching. The People, having
delegated judicial lawmaking power to the courts, could have
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 See John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules163
as a Constitutional Solution, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 365 (1999).
 See Stevens, op cit n. 38, 12.164
supervised the exercise of that power through an appropriately-
fashioned super majority of their representatives in the other branches
of government.  Just as the British Parliament, through the agency163
of the Lords’ appellate committee, closely and consistently supervises
those to whom it has delegated judicial lawmaking power , so the
American People, through the agency of a super majority of their
representatives, might have more closely and consistently supervised
those to whom they had delegated judicial lawmaking power. Had a
Senate super majority been so empowered, the evolving appellate
procedures of the House of Lords would probably have been
emulated, including its shift toward use of committees and its
publication of reasoning.  Though reversal by such a super majority164
would have been rare, the risk of its occurrence might well have had
a salutary influence on the temperament of America’s judicial
lawmakers. 
7. Conclusion 
In the century that followed Montesquieu’s publication of The
Spirit of the Laws, the principle of British parliamentary supremacy
progressed from widely-held constitutional suspicion to universally-
acknowledged constitutional verity. Montesquieu’s vision of checked
separation, as a description of the British system, proved inapposite.
Yet the institutional guise of separation remains in the respect that
Montesquieu cared about most, namely, that between executive and
legislature. If an un-bookish alien were invited to walk around the
government buildings of London and Washington and were then
asked which government looked more likely to conform to
Montesquieu’s theory, he might still pick the British, whose ostensible
chief executive continues to occupy a vast palace, her crest adorning
the great executive office buildings of Whitehall, while the American
c.e.o. sits in a southern plantation house. Britain’s new Supreme
Court, or rather, the grand and freestanding structure it will doubtless
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occupy, will further assist in misleading our alien visitor. But it will
not separate power in any way that Montesquieu would have valued,
nor in any way that we should value now.
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